Encryption & Cryptographic Standards
This page answers the question security teams and procurement reviewers ask most often: what encryption does Surface Security use, and does it meet a standard?
Short version: Surface protects data in transit — the extension-to-backend channel — with two independent layers of encryption whose algorithms are all NIST/FIPS-approved (mutual TLS plus an ECDH + AES-256-GCM end-to-end layer). A separate application-level at-rest layer that encrypts certain stored secrets uses ChaCha20-Poly1305, which is a strong, modern AEAD cipher but is not on the FIPS-approved list — see At rest below. The product is also not currently FIPS 140-2/140-3 validated — a separate distinction explained further down.
Two layers of encryption
Traffic between the browser extension and the Surface backend is protected by two independent layers, so a weakness in one does not expose your data.
| Layer | What it protects | Technology |
|---|---|---|
| Transport encryption (TLS/mTLS) | Everything on the wire, including headers and metadata | Mutual TLS terminated at the Envoy gateway |
| Application-layer end-to-end encryption (E2E) | Request and response bodies, encrypted on the endpoint before they ever reach the network | ECDH + AES-256-GCM (see below) |
The E2E layer means the sensitive contents of a request are encrypted inside the browser extension and only decrypted by the backend API — they are never readable at any intermediary, even one that could see inside TLS.
Passwords never leave the endpoint. Surface never transmits or stores employee passwords. It sends only irreversible HMAC-SHA256 fingerprints. The encryption described here protects the telemetry and fingerprints, not passwords — because passwords are never in transit to begin with.
Algorithms used
In transit (extension ↔ backend)
Every primitive on the wire maps to a published NIST / FIPS-approved standard:
| Function | Algorithm | Standard |
|---|---|---|
| Key agreement | ECDH, curve P-256 | NIST SP 800-56A; P-256 from FIPS 186-4 |
| Key derivation | HKDF-SHA256 | NIST SP 800-56C / SP 800-108; SHA-256 from FIPS 180-4 |
| Data encryption | AES-256-GCM | FIPS 197 (AES) + NIST SP 800-38D (GCM) |
| Request authentication | ECDSA P-256 / SHA-256 | FIPS 186-4 |
| Password fingerprinting | HMAC-SHA256 | FIPS 198-1 |
Each request derives a fresh, single-use encryption key from an ephemeral key pair, so compromise of one request's key cannot decrypt any other request (forward secrecy). Keys live in memory only for the life of a single request.
At rest (application-level)
Beyond the database/object-store encryption your deployment provides, Surface applies its own field-level encryption to a small set of highly sensitive stored secrets — the backend's private keys and certificate material, directory-integration credentials (e.g. LDAP bind passwords), service-account keys, and similar sensitive configuration values.
| Function | Algorithm | FIPS status |
|---|---|---|
| At-rest secret encryption | ChaCha20-Poly1305 (AEAD) | Not a FIPS-approved cipher |
ChaCha20-Poly1305 is a strong, modern, widely-deployed AEAD construction (RFC 8439), but it is not on the NIST/FIPS-approved algorithm list. If your environment requires that all cryptography — at rest included — use only FIPS-approved algorithms, note this exception in your assessment and contact your Surface representative.
FIPS: approved algorithms vs. validated modules
This is the distinction that matters on a compliance questionnaire, and the two are easy to conflate:
- FIPS-approved algorithms — the math (AES, SHA-256, ECDSA, ECDH, HKDF) is on the NIST-approved list. Surface's in-transit cryptography meets this today. The one exception is the application-level at-rest layer, which uses ChaCha20-Poly1305 (a non-FIPS-approved cipher) — see above.
- FIPS 140-2 / 140-3 validation — a formal certification of a specific software module (the exact code that runs the math) by an accredited lab. This certifies the implementation, not the algorithm names. Surface is not currently FIPS 140-validated.
Surface's cryptography runs on two well-regarded, standard implementations — the browser's native Web Crypto API on the endpoint, and the Go standard library on the backend — neither of which is operated in a FIPS-validated mode in the current release.
Suggested wording for a security questionnaire
Surface Security uses NIST/FIPS-approved cryptographic algorithms (AES-256-GCM, ECDH and ECDSA on curve P-256, HKDF-SHA256, HMAC-SHA256) for its application-layer end-to-end encryption, layered over mutual TLS for transport encryption. A separate application-level at-rest layer that encrypts a small set of stored secrets (private keys, directory-integration credentials, service-account keys) uses ChaCha20-Poly1305, which is not a FIPS-approved cipher. The product is not currently FIPS 140-2/140-3 validated.
If FIPS 140 validation is a hard requirement for your environment, contact your Surface representative to discuss a roadmap.
Where encryption applies
| Data | Protection |
|---|---|
| Telemetry in transit (extension → backend) | E2E (AES-256-GCM) and mTLS — all FIPS-approved |
| Passwords | Never transmitted; HMAC-SHA256 fingerprints only |
| Sensitive stored secrets (keys, LDAP/service-account credentials) | Application-level ChaCha20-Poly1305 (not FIPS-approved) |
| Data at rest (general) | Managed by your deployment's database and object-store encryption |
General data-at-rest encryption depends on how your instance is deployed (for example, cloud provider disk and database encryption); it is configured at the infrastructure layer. The application-level ChaCha20-Poly1305 layer above is an additional protection Surface applies to specific high-value secrets on top of whatever your infrastructure provides.